CVE-2026-76877

WPML Multilingual CMS <= 4.9.7 - Unauthenticated Authentication Bypass in Language-per-Domain SSO via 'wpml_sso_token_domain' Parameter

2026-11-09 18:29
Yuto Hyakumoto

Strategic Overview

Status
Unpatched
Affected Plugin
WPML Multilingual CMS
Affected Version
<= 4.9.7
CVSS
8.1High
Weakness type
CWE-287 · Improper Authentication
CVE
CVE-2026-76877
View all WPML Multilingual CMS vulnerabilities

At a glance

CVE-2026-76877 is a high-severity Improper Authentication vulnerability in the WPML Multilingual CMS WordPress plugin, affecting versions <= 4.9.7. It carries a CVSS score of 8.1 (reachable over the network; high confidentiality, integrity, availability impact). Exploitation requires no authentication. No fixed release has been reported yet; treat installations running this software as exposed. Disclosed November 2026, reported by Yuto Hyakumoto.

Vulnerability Overview

The WPML Multilingual CMS plugin for WordPress is vulnerable to Authentication Bypass via Race Condition in versions up to, and including, 4.9.7. This is due to the `process_iframe_request` function's language-per-domain SSO handler generating the cross-domain sign-in token via `wp_create_nonce('wpml_sso')` on the logout landing page, where the browser has already discarded its authentication cookies — so `wp_get_session_token()` returns an empty string and the token collapses to the shared anonymous nonce for the current 12-hour tick rather than a user-bound secret — and then storing it in the `wpml_sso_user_<token>_<sha256('wpml_sso'.$domain)>` transient mapped to the victim's `user_id` with no binding to the specific sign-out action or requesting client. Because an unauthenticated attacker can independently derive the identical token by triggering the logout confirmation flow on `wp-login.php?action=logout`, and because the `is_iframe_request()` gate conditions (the per-domain SSO `started` transient and domain-hash derived from the public constant `SSO_NONCE`) are fully computable within the 60-second `SSO_TIMEOUT` window, an unauthenticated attacker can submit the forged `wpml_sso_token_domain` parameter with a `wpml_user_signed_in` status to a secondary language-domain endpoint before the legitimate `wpml_user_signed_out` iframe fires, causing WordPress authentication cookies to be issued for the victim. This makes it possible for unauthenticated attackers to gain access to accounts of users — including administrators — who are actively in the process of logging out during the race window.

Technical Analysis

The vector marks this flaw as remotely reachable over the network, and no privileges on the target site, and no interaction from a victim user. A successful exploit has high impact on confidentiality, integrity, availability — full site compromise territory.

CWE-287: Improper Authentication

WPML Multilingual CMS <= 4.9.7 carries this weakness at wpml_sso, and reaching it takes no account at all. Improper authentication means the mechanism that proves who a caller is can be satisfied without the secret it was supposed to require.

An attacker authenticates as another user — administrators included — without ever knowing a password, so password policies and login rate limits never come into play. No fixed build of this plugin is recorded for WPML Multilingual CMS yet, so installs running <= 4.9.7 stay exposed until the vendor ships one.

Remediation

No known patch available. Please review the vulnerability's details in depth and employ mitigations based on your organization's risk tolerance. It may be best to uninstall the affected software and find a replacement.

How does WordSec protect against this?

This one needs no account at all, which puts it outside what login hardening can reach; WordSec's login security narrows the account-level paths around it, and the firewall is what inspects the request itself. No patched version is recorded yet, which is the case where a filtering layer matters most, because there is nothing to update to.

  • Login Security
  • Alerts

External References

Related records

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